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Abstract
Stalking is one of the main types of abusive behaviour facilitated by technology. The purpose
of the current study was twofold: to identify the challenges of cyberstalking investigations
and prosecutions in Australia and determine how best to investigate these types of offences.
A qualitative analysis of four years of interviews, focus groups and participant observations
with police departments provides an overview of the cyberstalking investigative process.
The findings map out the process from the initial report of the incident to the preparation of
the prosecution brief. This analysis positions cyberstalking investigations as an interesting
case study in the midst of increased scrutiny about the way that police investigate
technology-facilitated abuse.
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Introduction
Cyber-enabled crime has become increasingly prevalent as the anonymity afforded by the Internet and the
volume of information shared online allows individuals to engage in such behaviours with ease (Holt,
Bossler and Seigfried-Spellar 2018). In this paper, we look at process mapping a cyber-enabled crime
investigation. More specifically, we focus on one type of cyber-enabled crime for which criminal
investigations are undertaken: cyberstalking. This study examines the following two research questions.
First, what are the challenges of cyberstalking investigations and prosecutions in Australia? Second, what
would best practice investigation look like? Cyberstalking is distinct from conventional stalking in that it
uses computer or other electronic communication-based technology (Miller 2012), including listening
devices, GPS, drones and apps to enable that crime (Douglas, Harris and Dragiewicz 2019; Eterovic-Soric
et al. 2017). Given that cyberstalking necessitates new types of criminal investigation processes, we
conducted a four-year study in Australia to determine how police investigate and prosecute cyberstalking
cases. This forms part of a larger exploratory study, which is the first of its kind to interview police with
high levels of experience in the policing of cyberstalking (see O’Shea et al. 2019). The larger study involves
preliminary interviews, analysis of reported criminal cases and judges’ sentencing remarks, as well as
follow-up interviews and participant observations. In the current study, we draw on the perspectives of
highly experienced police investigators, prosecutors, digital forensic examiners and policy officers to map
the cyberstalking investigative process.
Past research has suggested that police investigations of cyberstalking are linear and involve six key
stages: (1) interview the victim, (2) interview others, (3) victimology and risk assessment, (4) search for
additional digital evidence, (5) analyse crime scene characteristics and (6) identify motivation. If
necessary, these steps are repeated to ensure a complete understanding of the full ecology of an incident
(Casey 2011). Although police investigations of cyberstalking and other forms of technology-facilitated
abuse are heavily scrutinised, there is a lack of recent empirical evidence to inform best practice. We
suggest that police perspectives of their work constitute an important, perhaps crucial, data point in
exploring whether a linear process is fit for purpose when mapping cyber-enabled crime investigations.
What We Know about (Cyber)Stalking
In recent decades, the way that police investigate technology-facilitated abuse has come under increased
scrutiny in Australia. Shircore, Douglas and Morwood (2017) identified key areas of concern in the policing
of cyberstalking, with only one relating to the technological aspects of the crime. As well as demonstrating
poor risk assessment, Shircore, Douglas and Morwood (2017) noted that police were less likely to treat
cyberstalking as a serious crime, which was reflected in actions such as not attending to a victim, not
investigating or charging offenders in cases of breaches and inadequate support and appropriate
information given to the victim. Over 20 years ago, the Director of the Australian Institute of Criminology
initiated a conversation about digital technology and how this may present new challenges for policing.
Adam Graycar (as cited in McKemmish 1999: 1; emphasis added) explained that ‘the police profession
must be particularly adaptive, because criminal exploitation of digital technologies necessitates new types
of criminal investigation’. This process is referred to as functional adaptation, which requires police to
adapt their skills to respond to technology-driven changes in criminal behaviour (Johnson et al. 2020).
Technology has always shaped social life, and policing is no exception (Deflem and Chicoine 2014). The
contexts of human behaviour have rapidly changed due to technological innovation. Yet, policing practices
and knowledge of technologically facilitated crime remains sketchy, and the risk of detection from law
enforcement is much lower in online environments (Holt, Bossler and Seigfried-Spellar 2017). An
approach that could assist police departments in the area of cyber-policing is evidence-based policing,
which helps to determine ‘what works’ (Koziarski and Lee 2020). In addition, interrogating the underlying
processes that drive police work can assist us in understanding the tipping points that contribute to ‘what
does not work’, such as bad policing practices and policy. Lessons can be learned from past cases and
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applied to current cases with similar attributes to help inform best practice (Erne, Cherubini and Delémont
2020).
In operational policing, the term ‘cybercrime’ helps distinguish between new and old types of crimes
(McGuire and Dowling 2013). It is regarded by many as an umbrella term covering a wide range of criminal
behaviours involving new technologies, including cyberattacks against individuals, businesses and
governments (De Paoli et al. 2020; INTERPOL 2021), child sexual abuse material, image-based abuse,
piracy and fraud (Walsh et al. 2020). Cybercrime is progressing at an extreme pace, with new trends and
methods exploiting the new technologies emerging constantly. The eSafety Commissioner has reported
that abuse facilitated by technology is becoming more widespread, including regional and remote areas
(Brown et al. 2021). Stalking is one of the main types of abusive behaviour facilitated by technology,
alongside harassment, impersonation and threats (Brown et al. 2021). Figure 1 outlines the distinction
between ‘cybercrime’ and ‘cyber-enabled crime’ in a policing context.

CYBERCRIME

CYBERENABLED
CRIME

•

Sophisticated attacks or high-tech crimes

•

Cyber-dependent crime as offences generated solely using computers
and networks

•

Examples include hacking, malware attacks and distributed denial-ofservice extortion

•

Traditional crimes that are facilitated by technology

•

Cyber-facilitated crime as offences facilitated or amplified by digital
technology but not dependent on it

•

Examples include sexual abuse of children, financial crimes and terrorism

Figure 1: Distinction between cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime in a policing context
(Adapted from The INTERPOL Foundation n.d.; Wilson-Kovacs 2021)

The distinction between cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime is critical to policing as digital technology
plays an important role in traditional forms of crime (Leukfeldt, Notté and Malsch 2020). This distinction
influences not only the perception of harm but also the ways in which these offences are investigated and
prosecuted. However, victim reporting shows that cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime can co-occur,
particularly in cases of stalking and hacking (e.g., hacking an email account in a cyberstalking case;
Leukfeldt, Notté and Malsch 2020). Cyberstalking is legally and conceptually defined as a subcategory of
stalking (Nobles et al. 2014) rather than a form of cybercrime and is considered a clear risk factor for
serious harm and fatalities in the context of domestic abuse (Douglas, as cited in McKenna and Roberts
2020). MacKenzie et al. (2011) explain that stalking motivations vary substantially:
•
•

to reconcile a previous intimate relationship
to exact revenge for a perceived rejection
IJCJ&SD
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•
•
•
•
•
•

to derive power and control from inducing fear in the victim
to get a date or a short-term sexual relationship
to obtain sexual gratification
to establish an emotional connection and an intimate relationship although based on delusional
beliefs
to obtain information about the victim as a precursor to a sexual assault
severe mental illness.

In Australia, cyberstalking is widespread, and it affects one in five women and one in 13 men at some time
in their life (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017). Notably, stalking occurs over weeks, months or even
years (Kropp, Hart and Lyon 2002; Mohandie et al. 2006; Spitzberg and Cupach 2014). For a successful
prosecution, at least two incidents must be proven to establish a pattern of behaviour that meets the
threshold of cyberstalking (Quarmby 2014).
However, it is notoriously difficult to prosecute for four main reasons (Fissel, Reyns and Fisher 2020).
First, many cyberstalking victims are unaware that a crime has been committed against them (Mishra and
Mishra 2013). Second, typically at least two incidents of tech-based threats, stalking or other unwanted
contact must be proven to establish a pattern of behaviour that meets the threshold of cyberstalking
(Douglas 2015; Quarmby 2014). Third, the victim and perpetrator may reside in separate jurisdictions
and, therefore, not be subject to the same laws (Quarmby 2014). Finally, most cyberstalking victims do not
report their victimisation to the police or seek professional help (Fissel 2021; Reyns and Englebrecht
2010). This study uncovers some of the challenges for police investigators and prosecutors and highlights
the importance of an effective investigative process minimising risk and harm.
Methodology
The research reported in this article is based on 23 semi-structured interviews, two focus groups and
participant observations conducted during a four-year study centred on developing partnerships and
mapping cyberstalking investigations with police departments in Australia. The qualitative methodology
used in this study offers the potential to enhance collaborative partnerships between researchers and
practitioners (e.g., police–academic partnerships; Jenkins 2015). Qualitative methods can also improve the
external validity of police research findings (Eck 2010; Jenkins 2015). This qualitative study was
conducted to gain a clear understanding of the process of the investigation and prosecution of
cyberstalking cases in Australia. The methodological framework used in the present analysis is based on
the need to understand the cyberstalking investigative process, from the initial report of the incident to
the preparation of the prosecution brief.
Interviews and focus groups were all conducted by the lead author with individuals who were key
informants on investigating and prosecuting cyberstalking cases in Australia. The interviews and focus
groups were audio-recorded and transcribed. The interviews and focus groups used a semi-structured
interview guide to allow for research fluidity and guided conversations to map the cyberstalking
investigative process. Semi-structured interviews and focus groups were determined as the most
appropriate methods to extract expert knowledge from police investigators, prosecutors, digital forensic
examiners, and policy officers, and each lasted between 45 and 60 minutes. The interviews were
conducted face to face or by telephone over four years from January 2015 to December 2019.
Preliminary interviews were conducted to initiate a discussion of the investigative process and explore
legislation and victim safety protocols in use in each jurisdiction. The procedure for understanding this
process was described in detail by O’Shea et al. (2019). A total of 23 highly experienced investigators and
prosecutors from three Australian jurisdictions participated in the study. They were supplemented by
focus groups with family violence policy officers and digital forensic examiners.
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Research participants were asked about:
(1) their definition or understanding of what constitutes cyberstalking, including the types of
activities classed as cyberstalking in their jurisdiction
(2) the stages of the investigation when a report of cyberstalking is made, who is involved in the
investigation of a case of cyberstalking and the level of resourcing and interoperability with other
agencies and organisations
(3) the types of sanctions given to perpetrators of cyberstalking and the measures put in place (and
their efficacy) to ensure the safety of victims of cyberstalking
(4) what is unique in investigating offline, online and cyber-enabled stalking.
Participant observation was used to reveal the technical processes and the police management systems
underpinning the investigation of cyberstalking. In a move towards evidence-based policing, police–
academic partnerships demonstrate a shift from conducting research on police to conducting research
with police (Goode and Lumsden 2016). One such technique is shadowing, which is a qualitative research
method for studying individuals in their organisational context (McDonald 2005). A strength of shadowing
is that it does not rely solely on an individual’s account of their role in the organisation but views it directly
in the research location (McDonald 2005). The practice of reflexivity is beneficial in shadowing as it
enables the researcher to be attentive towards the flow of action and to be directly involved in the reality
being observed (Bartkowiak‐Theron and Sappey 2012; Meunier and Vasquez 2008).
This applied criminological method was adopted in our study by way of ‘ridealongs’ with police and site
visits of courts, both of which are commonly used as research tools in policing and criminal justice research
(Lawrenz, Keiser and Lavoie 2003). Travel to and from locations and walks between buildings would
ordinarily be considered as ‘down time’. However, shadowing allows the researcher to utilise this time
with participants (Bartkowiak‐Theron and Sappey 2012). During this time, the researcher can seek
explanations and interpretations from the shadowed participant about a particular encounter and their
explanation for and description of their decision-making process (Bartkowiak‐Theron and Sappey 2012).
The study was conducted in police stations in the three jurisdictions. While each police station has its own
way of dealing with cyberstalking incidents, the investigators and prosecutors were linked as the criminal
law in their jurisdictions is wholly codified. In the states and territories where this study has been
conducted, approval was obtained from the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee
(reference H0014580). No rewards were offered for participation in this study, and no participants
withdrew from the study. To ensure confidentiality, participants’ names and jurisdictions have been
replaced with codes, which are used in presenting the key findings below.
Thematic analysis was used to understand the cyberstalking investigative process in the jurisdictions and
find patterns across the interviews and observational data (Braun and Clarke 2006). Transcripts were
analysed using Seba and Rowley’s (2010) three-stage thematic analysis approach. First, transcripts from
each police jurisdiction were analysed to identify key themes. Next, common themes across individual
responses were identified. Finally, comparisons between the analyses provided an overview of the
cyberstalking investigative process in Australia. This is regarded as the most appropriate method when
investigating areas that lack research (Braun and Clarke 2006). Thematic analysis extracts trustworthy
and insightful findings through the identification of patterns in a dataset (Nowell et al. 2017). The
knowledge gained from the interviews, focus groups and observational data assisted in the development
of work process flow charts for investigating and prosecuting cyberstalking.
What We Found about Cyberstalking from First Responders and Investigators
To understand the wider contexts of cyberstalking investigations, in this study we brought together police
investigators, prosecutors, digital forensic examiners, policy officers and researchers who have
contributed to the conceptualisation and operationalisation of cyberstalking in Australia. Before
IJCJ&SD
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considering the process of cyberstalking investigations, we summarise the key themes identified in the
interviews, focus groups and observational data collected to provide an overview of the current Australian
definition of cyberstalking. This provides the context from which to identify the challenges of cyberstalking
investigations and prosecutions in Australia and to propose an ideal model for cyberstalking
investigations. Later, we discuss what best practice should look like by providing an overview of the
cyberstalking investigative process. We identified five reoccurring themes from the data, which assisted
in developing flow charts that reflect the linear and nonlinear investigative processes discussed by our
participants. The identified themes were:
(1) definitional challenges of cyberstalking, such as listing computer or other electronic
communication-based technology that is not exhaustive
(2) procedural challenges during the initial reporting stage of a cyberstalking investigation to
accurately record a course of conduct
(3) legislative challenges when adapting to new technological requirements under the existing
framework
(4) evidentiary challenges due to an over-reliance on evidence gathered by victims, as well as
difficulties engaging with social media companies
(5) victim safety challenges when implementing proactive policing measures, such as duress alarm
systems.
Definitional Challenges
Police knowledge of what constitutes cyberstalking and what technologies and devices can be used in
cyberstalking are critical to best practice. All participants, when defining cyberstalking, included a list of
computer or other electronic communication-based technology currently found during their
investigations. The goal of participants was to capture the range of technologies, although this method of
defining cyber-enabled crime is not exhaustive as technology rapidly advances over time. The most
common technologies mentioned by participants were email and social media. Some interviewees also
reported a lack of technical knowledge by police officers who were not cybercrime specialists. For
instance, G6 explained:
Another example might be the one where they installed hidden software into the computer so
they could watch the victim. So that sort of stuff we deal with because it’s too technical for the
local police.
Monitoring-based technology was frequently mentioned by participants in addition to communicationbased technologies:
I would include any tracking devices or anything of a digital or electronic nature. Any apps that
facilitate a perpetrator being able to follow, view or monitor where [the victim] is going. (G14)
G14 raises an important point that it is not only communication-based technology but also monitoringbased technologies, such as listening devices, GPS, drones and apps, that are used to enable cybervictimisation. This presents additional challenges for police to detect and respond to cyberstalking due to
the anonymity of monitoring.
Procedural Challenges
Participants expressed sadness and frustration when describing the initial reporting stage of cyberstalking
investigations. These cyberstalking reports are pivotal for accurately recording a course of conduct by
frontline officers. Moreover, each incident of cyberstalking needs to be recorded to establish a pattern of
behaviour that meets the threshold of cyberstalking. At least two incidents must be proven. Challenges at
the initial reporting stage of the investigation can lead to police not attending to a victim, not investigating
or not charging offenders:
IJCJ&SD
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As a police officer, I felt very sorry for them that [the victim] has gone to a police station for a
particular reason. … They were reporting that one-off incident, and the copper hasn’t looked at
the bigger picture or hasn’t asked the questions and thought about it. That it has been going on
for this long, and that is stalking. (G20)
The reporting is particularly important for cyberstalking as it involves a set of behaviours or repeated
threats, stalking or other unwanted contact:
I guess from my perspective, cyberstalking is the ongoing harassment and intimidation in the
online environment on whatever platform that might be, whether that’s a chat platform and
email, or Facebook, social media. It’s the ongoing harassment and so forth that cause distress
and discomfort to the person who’s being harassed or stalked. (G6)
Accurately reporting each incident of cyberstalking is necessary to capture the ‘ongoing’ nature of the
offence.
Legislative Challenges
A recurrent theme throughout the interviews was adapting to new requirements under existing legislative
frameworks. Through our observations of police investigators, prosecutors, digital forensic examiners and
policy officers, we noticed different views on the relevance and applicability of legislative frameworks,
which was most obvious between digital forensic examiners compared to police investigators, prosecutors
and policy officers. Digital forensic examiners focused on ‘what works’, as stated by G22:
[Stalking legislation] now includes further wording to cover other effects such as causing
another person physical or mental harm, including self-harm or extreme humiliation. This
expansion clearly covers the cyber element of stalking in this day and age as it would typically
provide for prevalent behaviours such as online bullying via social media and revenge porn.
Through our observations of the participants, we noticed that the trend to focus on ‘what does not work’
was significant for police investigators, prosecutors and policy officers.
This trend was particularly evident during the interview with G6, one of the most experienced
investigators across multiple jurisdictions, who highlighted that certain cyberstalking behaviours do not
meet any existing pursue requirements under current legislation. The example G6 provided was:
A stalker posts an ad on a pornography website purporting to be their ex-partner and provides
their contact details. The victim then receives constant phone calls and messages from strangers
wanting sex because of the advert which does not meet any of the existing pursue requirements.
During the interview, G13 mentioned that digital technologies pose new challenges for police response
time:
You can track someone’s location through stalking and then physically go there and assault her.
So, the potential, you know, for it to happen in a short period of time has increased.
During this study, we found that criminal exploitation of digital technologies is a constant challenge for
police (see O’Shea et al. 2019).
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Evidentiary Challenges
A reoccurring theme from prosecutors was the challenge for police to engage with social media companies
in cyberstalking cases. The explanation provided by G21 was:
It’s so hard to get the social media accounts to come to the game. They always want privacy. If
there was a situation where we could access it, we could find out who made the accounts, find
out all the history, the deleted stuff. Then things would be easier. [The challenge is] trying to get
that information. Trying to get that information in an appropriate time. That if we get that
information straight away, it’s going to make it easier to show defence counsel; this is our case;
how are you going to get around that?
In future, social media has the potential to amplify policing (Trottier 2014) in the extent to which providers
recognise the ongoing digital evidence needs of law enforcement agencies. For example, part of the
investigative process requires subscriber checks from providers (e.g., telecommunications and adult
services websites).
In the past, cyberstalking investigations have relied heavily on evidence gathered by the victims
themselves. Digital forensic examiners who took part in this study via focus groups detailed the process
for corroborating evidence collected by the victims themselves:
1. Complaint received – statement obtained from the victim and any witnesses
2. Evidence collected – examination of cyber devices containing evidence or seizure of any other
evidentiary items connected to the allegation
3. Comparison of evidence to victim/witness evidence for corroboration purposes
4. Background enquiries conducted on suspect(s) – both online and traditional methods
5. Interview of the suspect
6. Assessment of evidence obtained from examinations, victim, witnesses and suspect
7. File prepared for review (by public prosecutions) for determination for charges. (G22, G23)
As explained by G20:
The victim needs to keep a record of their own interactions. You know, pop into your local
police station. Ringing them up to report that the matter has happened. You can’t always
guarantee in the way the police will report it, so that’s part of the downfall. … It all depends on
what police officer it’s reported to, their ability, and there’s a lot of variables with that.
This can deter cyberstalking victims from coming forward to police, as they are regularly asked to write
down incidents and keep handwritten notes, which can be traumatic (Policing Insight 2020). Recently, an
app called Preserved has been developed that allows cyberstalking victims to create a reliable record of
activity and information, including text messages, emails, photos, videos and voice memos (Policing Insight
2020).
Victim Safety Challenges
However, during the interview, G21 stated that most victims do not self-identify:
That’s the problem. I mean, if we did have education on cyberstalking, being able to identify it,
because most times stalking victims don’t realise until the end or halfway through that they are
being stalked. This pattern of behaviour. When you start talking to them, they realise.
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This raises the question: Are victims aware the behaviour that is concerning them is stalking at the time of
the initial report? Or could more be done by frontline officers to identify specific factors and report
patterns of behaviour when dealing with the victim and incident?
As part of another focus group, policy officers discussed their role in conceptualising new initiatives to
ensure the safety of cyberstalking victims. G12 noted that:
One of the problems for us is our duress alarm system is through mobile telephone. So, if you’ve
got a duress alarm on your phone, you can’t turn the caller ID off (which we would normally tell
people to turn off if they’re being cyberstalked) because otherwise, the duress alarm won’t work.
So that’s been a sort of issue that has come up in terms of proactive protection and prevention.
… and usually, if there’s a duress alarm, one of the behaviours is stalking.
Therefore, policy officers play a pivotal role in providing timely, accurate and evidence-based advice to
police departments.
Implications: What It Means for Policing Practice
The study focused on uncovering how police investigate and prosecute cyberstalking. Findings in the
current study align with the work of Shircore, Douglas and Morwood (2017) and reveal that some police
do not attend to a victim and do not investigate cyberstalking as a serious crime. In this section, we will
discuss what best practice investigation should look like by providing an overview of the cyberstalking
investigative process uncovered in this study. Past research described cyberstalking investigations as
linear and involving six key stages: (1) interview the victim, (2) interview others, (3) victimology and risk
assessment, (4) search for additional digital evidence, (5) analyse crime scene characteristics and (6)
identify motivation (Casey 2011).
However, this study found that there are many challenges that affect this process. In particular, the extent
of frontline officer involvement in cyberstalking investigations is crucial for successful prosecution
outcomes. It has even been suggested that the initial information provided to the frontline officer in
criminal cases can be the deciding factor in solving a case (Hinduja 2007). Frontline officers are required
to use considerable discretion. To some extent, this discretion can influence what crime is and,
consequently, how the police and their partner agencies respond (Myhill and Johnson 2016). However,
frontline officers who are responsible for taking the initial reports and collecting evidence may not be
sufficiently trained to conduct this work considering technology-driven changes.
Digital evidence includes, for instance, emails, chat logs, photos stored on devices, GPS devices and
browser history (Holt, Bossler and Seigfried-Spellar 2017). Digital evidence collected from social media
sites can be influential for years after the event (Holt, Bossler and Seigfried-Spellar 2017). Yet, we found
that challenges still exist for police to engage with social media companies and that police rely heavily on
evidence collected from victims to support cyberstalking prosecutions. Eck (1983) identified that police
need to be less reliant on information provided by the victim and be more proactive. This challenge
remains today.
Research on the detrimental effects of cyberstalking reveals that police should be more proactive in
providing victims with advice (Worsley et al. 2017). Safe at Home is one such initiative that aims to
improve safety and security for victims by outlining measures for proactive policing. Proactivity is
threefold: (1) being proactive in reporting, (2) proactively managing risk and safety and (3) proactive
prosecution and court responses to deter offenders. Police are encouraged to follow up all incidents with
the consolidation of family history, manage risk and safety planning, liaise with relevant agencies and
ensure a timely response (Safe at Home n.d.).
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The primary concern for victims of cyberstalking is for police to take action to arrest the perpetrator
(Worsley et al. 2017). However, there are many factors in play in the balancing between proactivity and
risk and safety planning. Policy officers play an important role in conceptualising new initiatives and
providing timely, accurate and evidence-based advice to police departments. One such initiative is the
introduction of duress alarms to family violence victims at high risk of stalking and repeated abuse
(Prenzler and Fardell 2016). However, policy officers in our study emphasised that proactive measures
being introduced also need thorough testing to ensure that the safety of victims remains paramount.
The process flow chart presented in Figure 2 was developed based on the interview, focus group and
participant observation data. Figure 2 reveals that cyberstalking investigations were described by
participants as a four-tiered process. The initial tier represents the initial reporting and dealing with the
victim and incident. The second tier involves the reporting of the incident, risk factors and patterns of
behaviour. The third tier provides a holistic review of the incident and consolidates information about the
perpetrator, victim–offender relationship and patterns of behaviour. Within this third tier are the full risk
assessment stages, which are outlined later in the article (see Figure 3). The fourth and final tier requires
the sharing and publication of information with public prosecutors.
DEAL WITH THE INCIDENT
FRONTLINE OFFICER

WRITE ABOUT THE INCIDENT
FRONTLINE OFFICER

REPORT: SPECIFIC FACTORS
FRONTLINE OFFICER

REPORT: PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR
FRONTLINE OFFICER

CONSOLIDATE THE HISTORY
FAMILY VIOLENCE TEAM

HOLISTIC REVIEW
FAMILY VIOLENCE TEAM

PUBLISH & SHARE
PUBLIC PROSECUTION
Figure 2: Stages of cyberstalking investigations

In comparison to the relatively straightforward process for cyberstalking investigation by police, the
process for cyberstalking risk assessment is much more iterative and reflexive than first described by
Casey (2011). This process flow chart (see Figure 3) was also developed based on the interview, focus
group and participant observation data to outline the cyberstalking risk assessment process.
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FULL RISK ASSESSMENT
FAMILY VIOLENCE TEAM AND
PARTNERING AGENCIES
STALKING RISK
BEHAVIOURS

ESCALATION

COMMON RISK
ASSESSMENT
COLD CASE TEAM

IDENTIFY GAPS
COLD CASE TEAM AND
SUPPORT OFFICERS
MODUS OPERANDI
(MO)

Figure 3: Stages of cyberstalking risk assessments

The second tier of cyberstalking investigations requires the reporting of the incident, risk factors and
patterns of behaviour. As shown in Figure 3, identifying stalking risk behaviours is imperative to
conducting a full risk assessment and recognising escalation. Escalation refers to the tendency of an
offender to commit increasingly more serious crimes over time (Piquero, Farrington and Blumstein 2003).
During the investigation, it is a necessity for best practice that police provide continuous risk and safety
planning, especially given that stalking, facilitated by digital technology, predicts both greater danger and
distress for the victim (Cattaneo, Cho and Botuck 2011).
For police to effectively manage the risks associated with cyberstalking, the methods of operation or
modus operandi (MO) needs to be established. This was identified by Casey (2011) as the final stage in the
cyberstalking investigative process. However, findings from the current study suggest that establishing
the MO is part of an iterative and reflexive risk assessment, as illustrated in Figure 3. As noted earlier,
MacKenzie et al. (2011) identified at least eight motivations for cyberstalking. As MO vary and can change
over time, continuous risk and safety planning throughout the entire police investigation is critical.
Establishing MO is particularly important for serial offenders and for a successful prosecution of
cyberstalking.
While Manning (1992), Chan (2001) and Brayne (2020) suggest frontline police resist change and
innovation, Maskály, Ivković and Neyroud (2021) and Hartmann and Hartmann (2020) found the opposite.
They suggest that a strength of frontline officers is that they are adaptive to new policies and systems,
especially as they are likely to be younger and more open to technological change than their older peers
and supervisors. We suggest that this capacity for adaptation is a necessity for policing due to rapid
developments in digital technology and that to assist with functional adaptation, teams that support the
frontline officer need to provide information back to the front line at the earliest available time.
To address these challenges, some researchers have called for collaborative work to develop innovative
and effective solutions to cybercrime (Cross et al. 2021) and cyber-enabled crime. Future research would
benefit from incorporating police-facilitated case conferencing to inform evidence-based policing and best
practice. Case conferencing (as occurs in hospitals after an unexpected death) may assist police
departments to provide a holistic, coordinated and integrated response to cyberstalking investigations.
Case conferencing encourages a multifaceted case management approach (Wan et al. 2010). It involves the
inclusion of all relevant stakeholders outlined in the stages of cyberstalking investigations. This approach
may assist with the challenges of accurately recording a ‘course of conduct’ by frontline officers (Myhill
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and Johnson 2016). Future research would benefit from incorporating police-facilitated case conferencing
to inform evidence-based policing and best practice.
Conclusion
Cyberstalking has the effect of making another person feel afraid, intimated or concerned for their safety,
and police play a pivotal role in identifying cyberstalking behaviours and managing the risks. This study
offers a range of insights into what cyberstalking is and how police investigate and prosecute
cyberstalking. The definition of cyberstalking varies across jurisdictions and among relevant stakeholders
(e.g., police investigators, prosecutors, digital forensic examiners, policy officers and researchers) and
individuals within these groups. Definitional differences have implications for what cyberstalking is and,
consequently, how the police respond to it. Based on the findings in this study, we suggest that police forces
consider training frontline officers on technology-driven changes to criminal behaviour as they are
responsible for taking initial reports and collecting evidence. To support frontline officers, information
uncovered in the investigation, such as risk assessments, needs to be provided back to the front line as
soon as possible. Iterative and reflexive mapping should be adopted for cyberstalking investigations to
facilitate continuous risk and safety planning.
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